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Abstract 
Safety nets have often been controversial instruments, condemned in some circles as 
short-term palliatives or even a waste of money. Much recent evidence shows that 
safety nets not only support poverty reduction but also economic growth. The existence 
of safety nets encourages adoption of higher income livelihood strategies that are 
associated with higher, but prudent, risk. Safety nets should be one component of a 
broader social protection strategy, which uses a plethora of instruments to address a 
wide array of risks and associated vulnerability. For the poorest of the poor one of their 
key concerns is access to sufficient food for a healthy and active life. Food-based safety 
nets are therefore an important instrument for some of the poor and food insecure who 
are vulnerable to critical levels of food deficit. Integration of safety nets within broader 
social protection strategies enables a more cohesive relief and development approach, as 
opposed to a relief to development continuum or more linear approach. This more 
approximates reality where relief and development activities generally coexist.  
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The conventional wisdom in mainstream development policy circles is that 
income transfers to the poor, and safety net policies more generally, are at best 
a short-term palliative and at worst a waste of money. They are not seen as a 
core element of an effective long-term poverty reduction strategy. 
This is the opening paragraph of Ravallion (2003) and seems to condemn all safety nets, 
whether transferred in food or cash, as putting brakes on the economic development 
process. But as Ravallion demonstrates, a wide body of evidence now exists that 
indicates there are many circumstances in which safety nets, as part of carefully planned 
social protection policies, can be a springboard for the poor to escape poverty.  
Ravallion identifies a number of reasons why the tradeoff between economic growth 
and lower inequality fostered by public transfers may be a false one. The most 
fundamental of which is the existence of the human basal metabolic rate—without an 
adequate food energy intake to support the functioning of the human body at rest there 
can be no productive activity at all. Thus, transfers that ensure beneficiaries can meet at 
least some measure above minimum energy requirements are essential if people are to 
contribute to economic growth.  
While the debate continues within economic development circles as to whether safety 
nets are a brake on the development process, costs for which there is no economic 
return, in other development fora there is a growing focus on rights-based approaches. 
Adopting a rights-based approach to social protection makes the economic arguments 
largely mute. Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) every person has a right to an adequate standard of living, including 
food, clothing, housing, medical care, social services and social security. Thus all 
countries that have ratified the ICESCR also agreed to the progressive realization of the 
enshrined rights, including those related to an adequate standard of living. Many 
subsequent conferences and summits have reaffirmed the right to food. Within the last 
decade these include the World Summit for Social Development and the Beijing 
Conference on Women both in 1995, and the Rome Declaration on World Food 
Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action in 1996, and the follow up five 
years later in 2002. The World Food Summit: 5 Years agreed to an inter-governmental 
process to develop voluntary guidelines on the implementation of the right to food. 
These guidelines were formulated and adopted in 2004.  
In this paper we show that safety nets do support economic growth, and poverty and 
food insecurity reduction. Our focus is on a subset of overall safety net instruments - the 
use of food-based safety nets, often explicitly geared to the achievement of food 
security objectives, rather than all safety net instruments. 
Section 2 explores the evolution of food security. In section 3 the interplay of 
vulnerability, risk management and the dynamics of food security is examined. 
Section  4 introduces the role of safety nets to address food insecurity. The section 
discusses the debate on whether to use food or cash as the instrument of transfer, briefly 
discusses targeting and outlines the most commonly used food-linked transfer 
programmes.   
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2  Exploring food insecurity 
Analytically and operationally the concept of food insecurity has undergone significant 
change over the past three decades (see Figure 1 and Haddad and Frankenberger 2003; 
Maxwell and Slater 2003).  
Food insecurity emerged in the international development agenda in the 1970s 
following the food price spikes of that period and the concerns about food availability 
(Maxwell 2001, 1998, 1996). Thus the focus was predominantly on global and national 
food production and stocks. In the 1980s the focus began to shift, sparked in part by 
Amartya Sen’s pioneering work on famines (Sen 1981). The 1980s were also marked by 
the early years of structural adjustment policies, and what many believed to be an 
overemphasis on a gross domestic product definition of poverty, which failed to fully 
capture the multiple manifestations of poverty including hunger. This led to a greater 
focus on households’ economic constraints in accessing the food that was available. The 
1990s witnessed greater attention on the utilization dimension of food insecurity, 
encompassing dietary diversity, and adequate complementary resources, such as health 
care, safe water and sanitation to ensure that adequate food consumption translated into 
good nutritional outcomes, and nutritional security. The 1990s also saw a growing focus 
on the role of women in food security, supported by economic analysis on intra-
household distribution of resources (Quisumbing et al. 1995; Haddad, Alderman and 
Hoddinott 1997).  
The year 1996 also saw the World Food Summit where the agreed definition of food 
security captured the evolving elements of the last 25 years: ‘Food security exists when 
all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life’ (FAO 1996).  
The late 1990s and the first four years of this millennium have seen a growing focus on 
an often neglected part of this definition: at all times. Food security is often seen as built 
on three pillars, availability (food is available through local, national or international 
food production), access (economic: individual, household, national income to purchase 
sufficient food) and utilization (safe, nutritious and diverse to meet needs). As noted by 
 
Figure 1 
The evolution of thinking about food insecurity 
 
Source:   Computed by the authors.  
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Haddad and Frankenberger (2003) ‘too often strategies to reduce food insecurity have 
been operationalized considering only the first three components of the food security 
definition. […]. The perspective that both emergency and development actors are 
missing is vulnerability’. This reflects the concept in the food security definition that a 
household that does not always know it will be able to put sufficient food on the table to 
adequately feed all its members is not food secure even if they have been able to do it 
for the last week, or month. Figure 1 indicates the general direction in which the 
thinking on food security has evolved in the last three decades.  
3  Vulnerability, risk management and food insecurity dynamics 
The concept of vulnerability has stimulated new analytical refinements which have 
greatly contributed to a better understanding of the processes that lead to food 
insecurity. Vulnerability arises from a complex web of economic, political and social 
conditions (see Figure 2), a process of cumulative conditions which vary over time and 
space depending largely on the changing processes by which individuals, households 
and communities fulfil their immediate subsistence needs and invest in medium- and 
long-term reproduction of their social system (WFP 2002; Alwang, Siegel and 
Jorgensen 2001; Siegel and Alwang 1999).  
While complexity underlies the definition ‘living on the edge’, it provides a graphic 
image of the livelihood circumstances that vulnerability conveys. Living on the edge 
evokes the image of a small push sending a person or people over the edge, and it is just 
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this knife-edge between ability to survive and thrive, and sudden loss of ability to do so, 
that vulnerability seeks to describe (Ellis 2003).  
However, quantifying vulnerability is like ‘trying to measure something that is not 
there, making the search for a visible reference point a difficult task’ (Webb and 
Harinarayan 1999: 298). Vulnerability can be addressed only by adopting a relative 
approach without referring to a defined benchmark or ‘gold standard’, such as with 
nutritional outcomes (Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2003; Ligon and Schechter 2002; 
Maxwell et al. 1999). Single measures of deprivation, such as the head-count indicator 
of poverty, capture basic information on the present condition but vulnerability seeks to 
capture the underlying causal processes that led to the actual status, and which will 
probably influence future conditions (Lautze et al. 2003). According to Frankenberger 
(2003: 21), ‘poverty and food insecurity are essentially static concepts whereas 
vulnerability is dynamic and describes how people move in and out of poverty and food 
insecurity’. 
It is now widely recognized that vulnerability can be lessened through effective risk 
management strategies aimed at (i) reducing the exposure to risks, (ii) increasing the 
ability to manage risks, or (iii) both1 (Haddad and Frankenberger 2003). While 
(i) enshrines the likelihood that individuals or households will be affected by a shock 
(i.e., the realized risk), (ii) captures individual’s or household’s ability to manage such 
threats, either before or after they occurred (Heitzmann, Canagarajah and Siegel 2002).  
The inability of the poor to manage risks may constrain them to poverty and food 
insecurity despite opportunities for escape. There are two possible explanations for this: 
dynamic poverty traps and livelihood choices that minimize risk at the expense of 
potentially higher incomes.  
One condition for a dynamic poverty trap lies in the necessity for human beings to 
consume sufficient food to provide energy in excess of the basal metabolic rate if they 
are to engage in productive activity. The productive activity must also generate 
sufficient income to compensate for the energy expended if the individual is not to enter 
a downward spiral. In essence, a dynamic trap means that a shock can drive household 
to such a level that it is unable to recover its previous income path. Studies by Jalan and 
Ravallion (2001) and Lokshin and Ravallion (2001a), the former using date from China 
and the latter from Hungary and Russia, show little evidence of dynamic poverty traps. 
In all cases households did bounce back from transient shocks, but those who were 
already on low-income paths took longer to recover, thus potentially giving the 
impression of dynamic poverty traps. 
Perhaps the more common issue is that poor people make choices regarding their 
livelihoods which despite improved livelihood possibilities, consign them to poverty 
because of their inability to access risk management instruments and their inability to 
‘self insure’ the risk through savings and prior asset accumulation. This is evidenced in 
many ways, particularly in rural areas, home to the majority of the world’s poor and 
food insecure. New agricultural technologies maybe ignored if more risky than the 
traditional (Morduch 1995). Households may grow more food crops and less higher 
                                                 
1   Public risk management can occur at various levels (at individual, household, community, national 
and regional level).  
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value commodity crops, despite lower overall aggregate income. This enables them to 
insure, in a consumption sense, against food price risk in the market place (de Janvry, 
Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991). Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002) show that in Pakistan, 
crop choices are determined more by concerns about risk than technological 
considerations of joint production. Households rearing livestock for milk production 
tend to be selfsufficient in fodder production despite an active fodder market. Milk 
production is sensitive to fodder prices, so households choose to be selfsufficient in 
fodder to reduce the risk of milk production losses due to fodder timeliness and price 
variability inherent in market reliance. They conclude that an elimination of fodder price 
risk would increase welfare by 5 per cent, an elimination of all risk would raise basmati 
rice cultivation by 30 per cent and hence income by 2 per cent, and welfare by 9.4 per 
cent. Jalan and Ravallion (2001) show that the poor in China hold wealth in 
unproductive, but readily realizable as income, mediums rather than in higher-return 
mediums. However, this behaviour is not adopted by the poorest quintile, presumably 
because they cannot afford to do so, nor by the richest quintile because they have 
alternative asset holdings available. Estimates indicate that poorer households have 
higher levels of risk aversion that wealthier. In Pakistan relative risk aversion varied 
from 1.8 to 20, with the largest values associated with the poorest households (Kurosaki 
and Fafchamps 2002). The average value in this study was 3.6, higher than values that 
Fafchamps and Pender (1997) find in India (1.8 to 3.1) but consistent with early 
estimates by Binswanger (1980). 
Risks and shocks are not the same phenomena because not all risks materialize and 
become shocks. While some risks cannot be eliminated, for example, most of the natural 
ones, most can be anticipated enabling an element of advance planning. Other risks can 
be de facto eradicated, such as polio and even malaria, a contributor to undernutrition 
and premature death in many parts of the developing world. When risk cannot be 
eliminated, the burden of risk management relies on the active provision of effective 
instruments to find a way to live with these phenomena (ISDR 2002: 5). In other words, 
‘enhancing resiliency does not mean reducing the number of shocks. […] Reducing 
vulnerability rests on helping communities better manage the many risks that they face 
on a daily basis’ (Webb and Rogers 2003: 8).  
Three broad classes of risk management are usually identified, namely ‘prevention’, 
‘mitigation’ and ‘coping’ strategies (Heitzmann, Canagarajah and Siegel 2002; 
Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000; Alderman and Paxson 1992). While prevention and 
mitigation strategies are both ex ante (i.e., undertaken before the shock materializes), 
the prevention ones reduce the probability of the shock from occurring, whereas 
mitigation strategies are aimed at reducing the potential impact of the shock when it 
does occur, for example through livelihood portfolio diversification or insurance 
mechanisms. While ex ante risk management actions may appear costly, as 
demonstrated by Walker and Ryan (1990) who find that households in semi-arid areas 
of India may sacrifice up to 25 per cent of their average incomes to reduce exposure to 
shocks, households are clearly willing to pay for more certain income streams.   
This demonstrates the value of risk management instruments to households. Effective 
public action that supports provision of such instruments, either public or private, would 
enable many of the poor to find their way out of poverty by adopting alternative 















Source:  Computed by the authors. 
Figure 3 shows two expected income profiles: A with a low mean but also a low 
associated variance/risk, and B with a higher expected mean but also higher associated 
risk/variance. A poor household will not adopt a livelihood strategy commensurate with 
profile B if they are unable to withstand the very low troughs in income that are 
possible. A simplified example may be a household living in an area which is prone to 
droughts, with insecure land tenure. Profile A may be represented by growing cassava, a 
food crop that is drought tolerant, with a fairly short maturation period and is locally 
marketed, or profile B by growing coffee, a long gestation cash crop. The income from 
coffee is far higher but carries the risk of not being drought tolerant, or potentially 
losing the land before the coffee plants reach maturity, or the harvest occurring at a 
trough in the international coffee price. Any one of these events or some combination 
could result in the very low troughs apparent in income profile B. A variety of risk 
management strategies and instruments, both public and private, could address these 
problems and enable a household to adopt profile B. Two strategies are apparent; reduce 
the variance of the income profiles by reducing the downside risk, hence raising 
expected mean income; or protect individuals and households should the risk exposure 
be realized. Investment in irrigation reduces the risk exposure to drought. A land 
registration programme that is sensitive to traditional tenure patterns, also promoting 
access by women, as opposed to single-right privatization reduces the risk exposure of 
loss of land. Investment in physical infrastructure, such as roads and health clinics, can 
reduce the volatility of prices caused by local supply fluctuations and reduce the 
incidence of health shocks. Insurance instruments, such as weather-based and/or 
commodity risk management instruments, provide protection against drought and/or the 
coffee being sold at a time of lows in the global price, thus reducing the size of the 
troughs in income profile B.  
Figure 3 is in essence a map of income profiles with higher and higher means. The goal 
of social protection should be to ensure that there is an array of risk management 
instruments available to households to enable these to move progressively from one 
income profile to a higher one. At some point their expected mean income would be 
above the poverty line. At the very lowest income profiles, it is likely that the 
instruments that remove the lowest troughs are publicly provided and fall in the social 
assistance genre. However, that does not make them unproductive, their existence 
enables households to adopt livelihoods consistent with higher-income streams in the  
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knowledge that there is a safety net. As the income level increases the needed risk 
management instruments are likely to be a mix of public and private instruments, 
including insurance schemes for commodity risk or weather for agriculture households, 
as well as other forms of insurance such as health insurance or unemployment 
insurance. Weather-based insurance can be accessible and paid for even by poor 
farmers. It not only protects them against the impact of a drought, flood, or other 
weather-based events for which the insurance is underwritten but increases their access 
to credit. Lenders recognize the income stream is more secure, thus farmers can increase 
productivity through the purchase of inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides. The current 
issue is the availability of risk management instruments. A range of social protection 
instruments needs to be available and known to households to enable them to take on 
prudent risks, but the portfolio used by households will depend on where they lie in the 
income spectrum.  
The unavailability of risk management instruments condemns households to coping 
strategies, undertaken to relieve the impact of shocks once they occur, which may be 
more costly than ex ante risk management. These ex post strategies usually involve the 
depletion, erosion and dis-saving of household financial, physical, human and natural 
capital. Poor households may be unable to fully cope or recover from a shock, becoming 
even more vulnerable to the next shock. Their asset holdings may be minimal and thus 
they are rendered destitute by the smallest income loss, running the risk of irreversible 
damages to their wealth base (Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2003). According to 
Maxwell and Frankenberger (1993: 29), ‘coping may be a misleading positive word, 
implying that food insecure households survive periods of high risk unscathed: in fact, 
households may survive only at a cost of significant impoverishment’.  
Vulnerability is a key  factor in distinguishing between chronic and transitory food 
insecurity. Transitory food insecurity is defined as a temporary inability to meet basic 
food needs or smooth food consumption levels due to periodical and cyclical 
fluctuations in incomes or unexpected temporary shocks. Households that persistently 
face deprivations over a significant timeframe (conventionally five years) are 
considered chronically food insecure. Chronic poverty and food insecurity are strongly 
associated with structural disadvantages, which are difficult to quickly reverse, typified 
by lack of assets, high dependency ratios, residence in remote locations, working in 
low-return occupational categories and chronic sickness and/or social barriers (CPRC 
2004; Bird et al. 2002; McKay and Lawson 2002). Not only do some of the chronically 
food insecure remain so for most of their lifetime, the condition is often transmitted to 
the next generation (Moore 2001).  
4  Looking at the most food insecure: the role of social safety nets 
In this section we provide an overview of safety nets in the context of social protection 
strategies, the mechanisms that protect those at risk on the lowest troughs in income 
profile in Figure 3. We examine the modalities for identifying intended beneficiaries, 
and the different instruments in the food-based safety nets portfolio.  
Policymakers, academics and practitioners often equate welfare, social security, safety 
nets, social assistance or social insurance mechanisms to social protection. Many of 
these terms have overlapping meanings, and all form components of social protection  
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strategies, but individually they do not equate to social protection. Social protection is 
the overarching policy framework that ensures cohesion among the various components, 
and the World Bank’s social protection sector strategy or the studies undertaken at IDS 
and ILO have clearly shown the need to move beyond mere transfers towards 
comprehensive forward-looking policies2 (GTZ 2004; Devereux 2003; Van Ginneken 
2003; World Bank 2001). 
The new discourse around social protection recognises that in the absence of effective 
collective arrangements to manage risks, individuals and households are forced to 
engage in micro-level, informal risk management strategies which frequently impose 
very high costs of their own. Interventions by governments should act on the risk 
management systems that already exist, with the objective of supporting functional 
behaviour and institutions and weakening dysfunctional behaviour and opportunities3 
(Shepherd 2004; Conway and Norton 2002). Public risk management policy should be 
‘to combine the best of private strategies with various public transfer programmes’ 
(Webb 2003: 16). Effective policymaking requires a nuanced understanding of poor 
people’s temporal decision framework and their livelihood strategies. This supports 
programme design that maximizes the effectiveness of private arrangements and 
supplements with public provision where optimal. Sophisticated diagnostic products, 
such as WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping or the World Bank’s Risk and 
Vulnerability Analysis, have been designed to support such policymaking by 
illuminating the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘why’ of food insecurity. 
Safety nets are a key pillar of social protection strategies, and the literature documenting 
their objectives and functions is very rich (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott 2004; WFP 
2004; Morley and Coady 2003; Subbarao 2003; Alderman 2002; Barrett 2002; 
Devereux 2002a; Rogers and Coates 2002; Tabor 2002; Castaneda 2000; 
Subbarao et al. 1997; Grosh 1994). Safety nets comprise both social assistance and 
social insurance functions (Haddad and Zeller 1996). The social assistance function is 
designed to bring households up to some minimum standard of living. This is the 
element of social protection most geared towards a government fulfilling its obligations 
under human rights considerations. Social insurance on the other hand provides a 
minimum floor to household income levels, for example to enable households to follow 
income path B in Figure 3. It ensures that in the event that a shock occurs a household is 
assured of a certain level of wellbeing.  
Safety nets need to be in place before a shock occurs, particularly from a social 
insurance perspective. The delivery instrument can be cash, in kind, with the most 
                                                 
2   However, this does not mean that in certain circumstances ‘pure’ transfers without any reciprocity are 
inappropriate (e.g., the welfare component of Table 1). Moving from narrower social assistance 
programmes to broader social protection strategies does not deny the importance of social assistance 
per se, but does emphasize the need for expanding the policy perspective (and consequent operational 
linkages). 
3   It is often argued that public action should not ‘crowd out’ informal risk management mechanisms, 
which in certain and well-defined circumstances may seem a contradiction when the objective is to 
stimulate a behavioural change (e.g., lessening risk aversion). Following Conway and Norton 
(2002: 537), ‘… the rationale for state action to reduce households’ exposure to risk and to help 
ameliorate the effects of shocks which do occur is at least partly to provide, through more efficient 
and equitable collective arrangements, a less onerous means of protection against vulnerability. […] 
Furthermore, state action may also include “crowding in” of other transfers’.  
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common in-kind instrument being food, or increasingly a hybrid with the transfer given 
in cash or near cash but conditional on certain behaviour or activities.  
4.1  Why food-based safety nets? 
Any food-based transfer which is infra-marginal, i.e., less than the household already 
consumes, can in essence be converted to cash if the household reduces its own 
purchase of the transferred item by an equal amount. This raises the question of why use 
food as a transfer instrument. Food distribution is often more challenging logistically 
than cash—transport, spoilage, packaging—and thus more costly to deliver. However, 
there are several reasons why food or food linked transfers are preferred: (i) impact on 
food related outcomes, such as child calorie consumption and health care utilization, 
may be greater; (ii) in food deficit areas with disrupted or unresponsive markets where 
cash transfers would result in increasing food prices; (iii) security costs may be lower 
with regard to food distribution than cash; (iv) cash and food are often not substitutable 
in terms of donor resource availability; and (v) political support for food linked transfers 
may be higher. The first is the key reason why a food-based transfers may be optimal 
when the goal is a food and nutrition security related outcome, as opposed to a poverty 
reduction outcome. A hungry population cannot learn, is less productive, more 
frequently ill, and more likely to die prematurely. The second reason is optimal if a cash 
transfer would increase food prices sufficiently to reduce the value of the transfer 
significantly, given the poor spend the majority of their income on food, and to push 
other non beneficiary households into or deeper into poverty.  
A direct income transfer to a poor household will always reduce the shortfall between 
households’ pre- and post-transfer income and hence degree of poverty. However, an 
income transfer will not always have the same level of impact on the nutrition or food 
security outcomes of a household as a cash equivalent transfer. Therefore, if a food 
security or nutrition related goal is the key objective, careful consideration needs to be 
given to the targeting mechanism and available instruments in order to make the choice 
between cash and food. In some cases, food maybe the preferred transfer mechanism. 
However, the instrument of transfer, whether cash or food, should be appropriate to both 
the programme objectives and the target group. Too often criticism is levelled at a 
programme because it did not reach a particular target group. Understanding the target 
group is a key criteria in picking both the transfer medium and instrument. For example, 
a public works programme is not appropriate for a target group of households that lacks 
available labour, either due to its demographic profile or because its working age 
population has high morbidity due to AIDS related illness. 
i)  In theory, food or cash-based transfers should have the same impact on 
household food consumption at the margin. But the reality may be somewhat 
different, depending on the gender of the transfer recipient and the knowledge 
base of the beneficiaries. The economist’s notion that a household has a single 
preference/utility function, whether common to all members or imposed by a 
household dictator, has been shown to be erroneous by numerous studies. This 
means the identity of a transfer recipient within a household matters to the 
desired outcome. Evidence indicates that the marginal dollar of household 
income in the hands of a woman is far more likely to be spent on food 
consumption, and on children’s wellbeing such as health care and education. 
As the household’s food utilization is normally under the control of a woman,  
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transfers in the form of food may be more likely to remain under women’s 
control and can be combined with other desired behavioural change. In 
Guatemala, the increase in household food expenditures would be almost 
double if the average yearly profits from nontraditional agricultural exports 
were in the hands of women (Katz 1992). In Brazil certain income sources in 
the hands of a woman, rather than a man, increase the likelihood of child 
survival in urban areas almost 20 fold (Thomas 1994). This means that if a 
food security or child welfare outcome is a key objective, then the choice of 
instrument used to transfer cash has to be carefully chosen to ensure it goes to 
women. When cash transfers are used they often use conditionality as one 
mechanism to ensure the transfer goes to women. The conditionality is usually 
based on a household behaviour which falls in the female domain, such as 
taking children for health checks, immunization and growth monitoring.  
ii)  A food transfer instrument is necessary in areas where food markets are either 
not functional or have limited functionality. This may be due to security 
concerns, such as civil conflict and unrest, or because lack of effective 
purchasing power combined with remote locations and lack of infrastructure 
have resulted in market failure. In these situations cash-based transfers would 
merely increase local food prices, resulting in limited, if any, increase in food 
consumption (Webb and Von Braun 1994). 
iii)  While direct food distribution may be logistically more complicated (bulky 
commodity, transportation, storage, etc.) and more expensive, there are often 
more security concerns using cash in economies where corruption and crime 
are serious issues. This is particularly true in areas where food aid delivery is 
most expensive, such as remote rural areas where, given the lack of rural 
finance institutions, cash may be the only suitable monetary alternative. While 
food is not immune to theft, its magnitude makes it more difficult and involves 
an extra transaction cost to realise a cash value. It was noted in a public works 
programme in Honduras that cash wages were delayed as only two workers 
were authorized to distribute cash wages to reduce the likelihood of theft or 
corruption. The food for work programme, however, delivered payments on 
time (Rogers and Coates 2002). 
iv)  If food aid and cash were substitutable, food aid would follow a counter-
cyclical cycle compared to food supplies being given according to need. When 
global grain production declines and stocks are low, the international price 
increases. Poor food-deficit countries are less able to finance their food needs 
through food imports, increasing the demand for food aid. But high food prices 
tend to be linked to lower availability of food aid not higher (Figure 4). This 
leads some to draw a conclusion that food aid transfers are linked to the 
agricultural policies of the OECD countries, and in particular to their 
agricultural subsidy policies. Food aid is argued to be the channel by which 
many OECD countries utilize their surplus production and maintain support to 
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Source:  Computed by the authors, based on data from FAO and WFP. 
Thus food aid and cash are unlikely to be perfectly substitutable from a donor 
perspective with an equal cash donation replacing a food aid donation. Food aid is used 
in three main forms by donor governments: (i) bilateral budget support to a country 
government, usually monetized in the marketplace of the recipient country; (ii) directed 
through the United Nations World Food Programme where it is used as targeted project 
food assistance; (iii) directed to nongovernmental organizations where it may be 
monetized or used as targeted project food assistance. Of late, many countries are 
untying their food aid to WFP, replacing in-kind contributions with cash. This can 
increase the developmental impact, as food commodities can be sourced directly in the 
recipient country or in a third neighbouring country and increase efficiency (OECD 
DAC 2005). 
Political support is critical to the sustainability of all safety net programmes, particularly 
as the prime beneficiaries are not normally those with strong political voice. 
Programmes—and the associated instruments—are more likely to be supported if there 
are clear eligibility mechanisms and if they are available to all when the eligibility 
criteria are met. For many, transfers in food are more politically acceptable as they 
appear to constrain people to good behaviour and to prevent beneficiaries from using an 
‘income’ transfer for less desirable purchases such as alcohol and cigarettes. This was 
demonstrated in the USA when a cash transfer programme was rejected by the US 
legislature as too generous while they subsequently agreed to an increase in food stamp 
benefits beyond the value of the proposed cash transfer plan (Rogers and Coates 2002). 
In Latin America increasing political support is demonstrated for conditional cash 
transfer programmes, where the conditionality is linked to good behaviours such as 
child growth monitoring, school attendance, etc.  
While the ‘food versus cash’ debate is often intense, empirical evidence on the right 
balance between the two is lacking. Non-food resources play a critical role in  
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complementing food-assisted programmes, ensuring better targeting and delivery to the 
most remote areas (Webb 2003). Oxfam reports that in the early stage of a flood 
response in Bangladesh, food was more appropriate than cash, given the 50 per cent rise 
in the price of rice due to many closed markets because of food supply access problems 
caused by the flooding (Khogali and Takhar 2001). When repairs were made and 
markets became functional, transitioning to cash would have been more appropriate. 
Table 1 summarizes the core dimensions for selection between food and cash. 
Table 1 
Food versus cash 
Food Transfers  Cash Transfers  Cross-Cutting Issues 
   
• administrative  capacities 
are weak 
•  markets are disrupted/non 
functional 
•  more likely to be self-
targeting 
•  HH nutrition goals, female 
beneficiaries 
• micronutrient  enrichment 
•  where capacities to manage 
them are in place 
•  well functioning markets 
•  less costly to manage 
•  fungible – no food 
security/nutrition goals 
•  easier to combine with 
near-cash transfers 
• administrative  costs 
• political  sensitivity 
•  targeting mechanisms and 
errors 
• disincentives  and 
distortions 
• crowding-out  effects 
Source:   Barrett and Maxwell (2005); Abdulai, Barrett and Hazell (2004); Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott 
(2004); Subbarao (2003); Barrett (2002); Del Ninno and Dorosh (2002); Devereux (2002b); 
Rogers and Coates (2002); Tabor (2002); Castaneda (2000); von Braun, Teklu and Webb 
(1999); Haddad, Alderman and Hoddinott (1997). 
4.2 Targeting  mechanisms 
Safety net programmes are intended to protect the poorest citizens in society or those 
who, as a result of a shock, find themselves temporarily below a given welfare level. 
This implies that the programmes need to identify the right beneficiaries. For example if 
10 per cent of a population of ten thousand are below the poverty line, and the average 
shortfall is US$10 then the cost to eliminate poverty without any effort made to identify 
the poor is US$100,000. However, if transfers are delivered only to the poor—perfect 
targeting—the cost of eliminating poverty would be US$10,000 or just 10 per cent of 
the cost of the untargeted programme. From a budgetary perspective, targeting involves 
tradeoffs between the administrative costs of obtaining information to support perfect 
targeting and delivery only to the target population, and the potential leakage of benefits 
to nontarget beneficiaries when less information is available. Generally the poorer the 
country, the less well developed are the information systems to support targeting. 
Targeting mechanisms may be individual/household, categorical, and self-targeting with 
associated costs declining from individual/household to self-targeting. In most cases, 
more than one form of targeting method is used. For example, the target group may be 
school children but only those attending school in the poorest district, both categorical 
targeting mechanisms, or public works programmes may have low wages and only 
operate in certain areas, self-targeting with categorical targeting.  
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Targeting mechanisms are also key criteria in ensuring political support. Instruments 
that are targeted to very narrow groups are less likely to gain political support. These 
can include some categorical targeting mechanisms, which may correspond with 
geographic areas with little political power by virtue of race or ethnic group.  
4.3  Food-based safety net instruments 
There is a wide array of food-based safety net instruments ranging from direct 
programmes where the transfer medium is food, restricting beneficiary choice 
completely, to indirect programmes where a cash transfer is linked to food purchase, 
where the choice of foods purchased can be restricted or unrestricted.  
Direct food programmes include supplemental feeding, school feeding, emergency 
feeding, generalized food distribution, and food for work. Indirect food-based 
programmes include food subsidies, and food stamps or vouchers or coupons. 
Supplemental feeding 
Supplemental feeding is generally targeted at vulnerable groups, usually pregnant and 
lactating women, and young children. Whether it is preventative or palliative is a critical 
element in terms of whether it is an insurance or assistance function in a safety net. 
Supplemental feeding for pregnant women and children is often only available to 
pregnant women and children who are failing to thrive. In the case of pregnant women 
this may be below recommended body mass index thresholds or failing to gain 
sufficient weight, and in children low anthropometric indicators. By this stage some 
irreversible damage has already been done. It also provides a perverse incentive effect 
to households who may choose to ‘behave’ badly in order to qualify for food assistance. 
In the poorest communities, it therefore makes sense to have an inclusive rather than a 
targeted programme. However, for outcomes to be sustainable, it is critical that 
nutritional education components are also central to the intervention. 
Food for education  
Food for education can take place on site through the provision of meals or through 
take-home rations. These programmes have been controversial in terms of their impact 
on nutritional outcomes. Many argue that the greatest vulnerability of a child to 
undernutrition is pre-school. This highlights the need to evaluate a programme by its 
objectives and clearly school feeding is not meant to tackle undernutrition in pre-
schoolers. School feeding programmes have many benefits, many of which extend 
beyond a nutritional dimension. When done through onsite feeding, these include 
improving the micronutrient content of children’s diets, reducing immediate hunger and 
improving children’s learning ability. When take-home rations are used, the food is 
likely to be shared among household members, and thus some of the nutritional impacts 
above may be lost for the schoolchild. This can also happen with onsite feeding as 
household food may be re-allocated away from the child fed in school and towards other 
members perceived to be more needy. Independent of the method of implementation, 
school feeding provides incentive effects to encourage children to enrol and stay in 
school. This may be particularly effective in attracting girls to school and retaining them 
in higher grades. The impact of increasing girls’ education should not be under-
anticipated, given its delaying impact on age at marriage, age at first birth, number of  
14 
children born, and future child nutrition outcomes as well as its contribution to fulfilling 
the right to education. 
Emergency feeding and generalized food distribution  
Emergency is a social assistance function, most often used in times of crisis, 
precipitated by war and civil unrest or by natural disaster, to protect lives. This may take 
the form of therapeutic feeding for severely malnourished children, and rations or 
feeding for a general population currently unable to access food. The goal, particularly 
in natural disasters such as floods and drought, should always be to feed families within 
the community to prevent distress asset sales and migration. However, in times of 
conflict this often takes place in refugee camps or camps for internally displaced 
persons.  
Food for work 
Food for work is best used as a livelihood protection mechanism, and is best 
implemented with an employment guarantee. This supports an insurance function to 
enable households to undertake more risk in their normal livelihood strategy than they 
may do in the absence of the programmes, knowing that should alternative livelihood 
means fail, food for work is available. The advance planning also enables appropriate 
attention to be paid to the type of works undertaken. This ensures that appropriate 
community assets are constructed or renovated/rehabilitated with appropriate plans for 
onward maintenance rather than ad hoc programmes that can be characterized by a ‘dig 
a hole, fill a hole’ mentality. These programmes prompt intense debate in terms of the 
instrument of transfer, food or cash. Food is the best mechanism if there is a market 
failure in the area of implementation, which constrains the availability of food. Food for 
work may also implicitly attract more women and thus have greater food security 
impacts on the household, particularly child food consumption. This may have been true 
in Zambia and Lesotho when 50 per cent of wages were paid through food stamps, as 
opposed to cash, and the programmes attracted more women than men (Subbarao et al. 
1997). Women participating in a food for work programme in Rajasthan (India) also 
reported that they preferred the food for work programme rather than a cash based one 
as they were able to participate. They felt that had payment been in cash their husbands 
would have participated and they would have been less likely to receive the money. 
Unfortunately these gender aspects of targeting through payment medium have been 
little researched. However, if women are a primary target group, it is important that the 
food payment is sufficient to allow for adequate household food consumption. It has 
been suggested that women can sacrifice their own nutritional status to protect their 
children’s and this is a particular risk in food for work programmes where energy 
expenditure can be greater than energy replacement (Higgins and Alderman 1997).  
Public works programmes generally use self-targeting through the wage rate. 
Self-targeting can be effective in social protection programmes when there are distinct 
behavioural differences between poorer and wealthier households. The lower the wage 
rate in a public works programmes, the more the programme is self-targeted to the 
poorer members of society. Wealthier members have access to better paying livelihood 
opportunities, or if unemployed, are unwilling to work for such low wages, indicating 
that they have access to other resources to maintain themselves. The classic public 
works programme is the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Programme which 
originally provided guaranteed employment year round, within five kilometres of a  
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beneficiary’s residence. However, in 1988 the wage rate was doubled in line with a 
doubling of the minimum wage. While the programme still operates intensively, 
particularly in the slack agricultural season, evidence shows that overall days of 
employment have reduced, and employment places are rationed, eroding the insurance 
function (Datt and Ravallion 1994).  
Wage rate setting is critical in the design of public works programmes and can be 
problematic in countries with minimum wage legislation, often enacted in support of 
human rights goals. In many poor countries the informal sector is dominant and the 
market wage in the sector is below any mandated minimum wage. If a public works 
programme is initiated to target the poorest with wages set at minimum wage levels, it 
will attract not only unemployed workers but also those from the informal sector. This 
is likely to result in employment rationing with the poorest being those potentially 
displaced. This creates a dilemma in the human rights field of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The progressive realization of these rights, including the right to food, 
where requires the maximization of resources going to the most food insecure people. 
Food subsidies  
These programmes, when universal, are generally the easiest to obtain political support 
for as they are, by default, available to all. In essence they increase household 
purchasing power by reducing the price of certain foods. The degree of subsidy received 
depends on the amount of the subsidized food purchased. So while the subsidy as a 
percentage of household food expenditure may be greater for the poor, the absolute 
value of the subsidy received maybe greater for richer households. In Tunisia in 1990, 
the poorest quintile received just 17 per cent of the subsidies on food compared to 20 
per cent received by the rich. But in relative terms, the subsidies were progressive, 
representing 8.7 per cent of the total expenditures of the poor and just 3.5 per cent of the 
rich (Tuck and Lindert 1996). In a review of 85 social protection programmes, Coady, 
Grosh and Hoddinott find that seven of the ten worst performing programmes in terms 
of delivering benefits disproportionately to the poor were food subsidy programmes that 
were largely universal. 
These subsidies can be targeted either by quotas or rationing using other targeting 
criteria or by subsidizing inferior foods; consumption falls as income rises. In Tunisia 
universal food subsidies were reformed, using self-targeting mechanisms that 
recognized different food habits between poor and wealthy people. Subsidies were 
removed from olive oil, the oil preferred by consumers, but were present on generic 
grain oil purchased in stores from a vat, as opposed to being prepackaged in individual 
bottles. This discouraged consumption by wealthier groups who preferred purchasing 
bottles of olive oil. Similarly, milk subsidies were restricted to reconstituted milk in 
smaller, less convenient packages as opposed to fresh milk in preferred packaging (Tuck 
and Lindert 1996). These programmes are consistent with the progressive realization of 
the right to food in that they prioritize resources to the most food insecure and do not 
use foods that are inferior from the perspective of food safety, only from the perspective 
of choice.  
Food stamps 
Food stamps/vouchers/coupons also increase the available purchasing power of a 
household but give recipients a greater degree of choice than direct food transfers.  
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While households can reduce their own purchase of food items to increase available 
cash resources, evidence from the USA indicates that food consumption is increased by 
more than using an equivalent cash transfer (Fraker et al. 1995). A food stamp 
programme requires a well-developed retail food sector, and a secure and ready means 
of redemption for the retail sector to encourage them to accept the stamps. They also 
require a secure instrument and delivery mechanism to reduce the likelihood of a 
secondary ‘currency’ market in food stamps. Fraudulent duplication of food stamps can 
have unanticipated and significant impacts on government budgets. For these reasons 
food stamps tend not to have been widely used in the poorest developing countries, 
although there has been some success using them as an incentive system to utilize other 
social programmes.  
As illustrated, the safety net instruments using food are numerous, able to support both a 
social assistance and insurance roles, and hence developmental role. Safety nets targeted 
to food security and the mitigation or prevention of undernutrition yield benefits 
throughout the lifecycle. Maternal malnutrition increases the likelihood of low birth-
weight babies that increase the likelihood of child undernutrition and the onset of 
chronic noncommunicable diseases in adulthood such as diabetes, hypertension, and 
cardiovascular diseases (Ruel 2001; Barker 1998). Undernourished children enrol in 
school later, repeat more grades, and have lower school achievements (Pollitt 1990; 
Behrman 1996). This lowered accumulation of human capital together with stunting 
(impaired height as a result of chronic undernutrition) lowers lifetime earnings 
(Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2003; Haddad and Bouis 1991; Strauss and Thomas 
1998).  
The relief-to-development framework adopted in the 1990s has not been effective: its 
sequential nature does not reflect the reality in the field nor a clear path from emergency 
programmes to development-based activities. The reality of many shock-prone, 
chronically food-insecure countries is that relief and development can and often do 
occur in the same spatial environment at the same time (CARE 2003; Haddad and 
Frankenberger 2003). Where humanitarian action is ad hoc, the development of a social 
protection system provides an opportunity to transform haphazard safety net 
programmes into a nationwide system to support communities, households and 
individuals in achieving secure livelihoods4 (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). 
5 Conclusions 
There is increasing recognition that safety nets need to be part of an overall social 
protection strategy. A social protection approach offers the opportunity for an integrated 
relief and development framework as opposed to the current linear sequencing. Safety 
nets protect the chronically food insecure, who may never be able support themselves, 
and as such fulfil a governments obligations to assure an acceptable standard of living 
for all its citizens. When incorporated in a well articulated social protection system they 
enable the poor to engage in livelihood strategies that offer the potential for pathways 
                                                 
4    Following De Haan (2000: 2), ‘adopting social protection as an organizing framework ‘helps to 
re-focus social protection policies, moving beyond a residualist welfare agenda dealing with the 
negative social consequences of economic changes and transitions, towards holistic approaches that 
inform the wide range of policies that affect the wellbeing of the poor’.  
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out of poverty, by providing risk mitigating opportunities. Safety nets delivered using 
food linked transfers have a critical role to play, and are used to achieve different goals 
to those delivered in cash. Promising experiences are emerging worldwide where 
predictable safety nets, both food and cash based, are explicitly designed to promote the 
graduation of households out of chronic food insecurity. Examples include the widely 
documented Mexican PROGRESA/Oportunidades, or the more recent Ethiopian 
Productive Safety Net Programme, Afghanistan’s Livelihoods and Social Protection 
Public Investment Programme, Malawi’s Joint Integrated Safety Net Programme, and 
Ecuador’s social protection strategy implemented under the newly-established Frente 
Social. While the overall direction looks promising, most of these strategies are in the 
early stages and cannot yet be evaluated in terms of how many people graduate, and 
whether graduation is permanent or consists of several periods of reutilization of the 
safety net. 
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